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SYMPOSIUMt
PRECLUSION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Robert C. Casadtt
On behalf of the panel, I want to welcome you to this 1985
meeting of the Civil Procedure Section. The subject of our program
is timely and significant. Chairman Kevin Clermont chose wisely
when he selected "Preclusion in a Federal System" as the theme. It
is a subject that is both fascinating and frustrating. The Supreme
Court has paid quite a bit of attention to certain aspects of this subject in recent years-and two such cases are currently pending
before the Court.'
The subject is certainly not a simple one. One reason that it is
so difficult to deal with, of course, stems from the obvious fact that
the preclusive effects of ajudgment are determined, not by the court
that rendered the judgment, but by a different court-or at least in a
different action. So we are always thinking about a situation involving two different actions when we think about preclusion. The implications of this duality can become quite confusing and are almost
impossible to discuss in elegant English. The potential for confusion inherent in this duality is compounded in the United States by
our federal system of multiple sovereignties. This makes it necessary for us to distinguish between the preclusive effects of a domestic judgment and those of a judgment rendered by a court of a
different sovereignty. When the second action-i.e., the action in
which the preclusive effects of the first judgment must be determined-is brought in the courts of a different state, a choice of law
t
The four articles in this symposium were delivered on Jan. 5, 1985, at the
meeting of the Civil Procedure Section of the Association of American Law Schools.
t? John H. andJohn M. Kane Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
A.B. 1950, M.A. 1952, University of Kansas; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan; S.J.D.
1979, Harvard University.
I After these comments were delivered, the Supreme Court decided these two
cases. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 53 U.S.L.W. 4265
(U.S. Mar. 4, 1985), rev ', 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v.
Dann, 105 S. Ct. 1058 (1985), rev ', 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court
opinion in Marreseis discussed in Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to ProfessorHazard and a
Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 659 (1985).
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problem has to be considered on top of the basic question of preclusion law. What law should the second court look to in order to determine the preclusive effect of the first court's judgment: forum
one or forum two? The full faith and credit clause 2 and statute 3 give
a partial but not a complete answer. The statute says the judgments
of any state, territory, or possession shall have the "same full faith
and credit" in every other court in the United States as they have in
the state, territory, or possession from which they are taken. 4 But
we know that there are some exceptions to that requirement. Moreover, we still do not know for sure the answer to the very fundamental question: does the word "same" in the statutory command of
full faith and credit mean "exactly the same"-neither more nor
less-or does it mean simply "no less," or "at least as great"?
The difficulty of our subject is further compounded by the concurrent operation within the same territory of federal and state laws
and federal and state courts. Is a federal court obliged to give the
same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as another state
court would be? The full faith and credit statute seems to say so.
But that statute says nothing about the preclusive effect of a federal
court's judgment. What law does answer that question? Do the
same standards apply to determine a federal judgment's preclusive
effect when the second action is in the same federal court as apply
when the second action is in a different federal court or in a state
court? If there is no specific federal statute on point, is the question of the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment governed by
state law or federal common law? If it be state law, is that so because of the Rules of Decision Act, 5 or the Erie Doctrine, or some
other reason? If it be federal common law, are the same rules of
preclusion applicable nationwide to every judgment of every federal
court? Or may federal law borrow and incorporate state law rules
for this purpose in some kinds of cases? If so, what state's rules are
to be borrowed, and in what kinds of cases? Do the answers to these
questions depend on whether the federal court that rendered the
first judgment was sitting in the exercise of federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction? Supreme Court cases, again, have
given partial but not complete answers to these questions. They
have recognized that there is a body of federal preclusion law that is
not dependent upon any state's law, 6 and that both federal and state
2

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
4 Id.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
6 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
324 n.12 (1971) (citing Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)) (federal courts
apply their own res judicata rules in nondiversity cases); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
3
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courts must apply that law in determining the effects of federal court
judgments rendered in federal question cases (or at least some federal question cases). 7 The source of the law that determines the
preclusive effect of a diversity judgment, however, remains a subject
of debate.
A further complicating duality stems from the fact that preclusion rules can implicate not only procedural but also substantive interests, both in forum one and forum two. In the state court
context-where a court of state one has adjudicated a case under
the substantive law of state two-it is settled that state two courts
generally are bound by the full faith and credit statute to give the
judgment as much effect as it would have in state one, even if that
may significantly affect substantive rights based on state two law in a
way that is contrary to state two policy. 8 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has indicated that state rules of preclusion determine the effects of state court judgments on matters governed by federal law
even where the state court has adjudicated a federal right or cause
of action. 9 Federal courts must give the state court judgment the
preclusive effects prescribed by state law, and that is true even if
there would be no preclusion under federal law standards if the forum one court had been a federal court. 10 And the duty to follow
state rules of preclusion applies to matters of claim preclusion as
well as to matters of issue preclusion, despite the conflict that this
poses with the statutes purporting to give a right of access to a federal forum for the adjudication of federal rights."
OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982) (federal law determines effects under rules of res judicata of
federal court judgment).
7 See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938) (question before state
court reviewing federal court judgment in federal question case is res judicata, not full
faith and credit); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 517, 520 (1903) (federal law
controls res judicata effect of federal court decisions in federal question cases).
8 See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Missouri court judgment applying Mississippi law is entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi courts, even if Missouri was mistaken as to Mississippi law).
9 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (state court determination of
issue, where parties granted full and fair opportunity to litigate, is entitled to preclusive
effect in federal court even though federal right is being asserted).
10 See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) (extending Allen to claim preclusion if state law would preclude subsequent suit); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 86 comment c (1982) (valid and final judgment
of state court has same res judicata effect in subsequent federal action as it would in
state court action).
I1 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not create exception to rule that federal courts must give full
faith and credit to state court judgments); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 104 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not grant person claiming federal right unrestricted opportunity to relitigate issue already decided in state court); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947)
(state court judgment is resjudicata on petitioner's federal question claims even if adjudication of those claims by state court was erroneous). But see Haring v. Prosise, 462
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This last mentioned problem is particularly troublesome when
the preclusive effects of a state court judgment are invoked in a later
federal action in a case in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive.
Should a state judgment ever be given preclusive effect so as to prejudge any matters in such cases? Should a distinction be made between issue preclusion and claim preclusion? The Supreme Court's
decision in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons12 could
produce an answer to this as well as other questions.
These opening observations are not news to any of you. They
are intended merely to outline the subject of preclusion in a federal
system, to pose some of its sub-problems and to warm up the audience for the main speakers who will follow. Perhaps I have made it
seem like a subject more appropriate for the section on Conflict of
Laws, but I do not see how we as teachers of civil procedure can
avoid these conflicts problems. We certainly must try to understand
them, even if we do not go deeply into them in our first year civil
procedure courses. The subject is difficult, but not hopelessly so.
We are fortunate to have as our speakers today two outstanding
young scholars who are currently working on articles that I think are
destined to make significant contributions to the understanding of
this subject: Professor Judith Resnik, whose article "Tiers" has already appeared in the Southern CaliforniaLaw Review, 13 and Professor
Stephen Burbank, whose article, tentatively entitled "Interjurisdictional Preclusion and Federal Common Law" is still in draft stage.
We are also very pleased to have with us Professor Geoffrey Hazard,
Jr., who will wind up the presentations as our commentator. Professor Hazard needs no introduction to a gathering of civil procedure
professors. We all, I suspect, make heavy use of his many books and
articles on procedure, particularly the work that is of the greatest
importance to our present subject: the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, of which he was the principal reporter. I suspect there are
few, if any, persons in the country today who have done more thinking about preclusion law in general than Professor Hazard.

U.S. 306 (1983) (guilty plea in state criminal proceeding does not bar suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 where state collateral estoppel rules would not be invoked).
12
53 U.S.L.W. 4265 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1985), rev'" 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en
banc).
13 Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984).

